The 1990's witnessed a historically unprecedented number of personal bankruptcy …lings. In response, Congressional debate over bankruptcy law has recently led to sev eral proposals aimed at making it more di¢cult to exempt wealth in a bankruptcy. In this paper, I evaluate uniform exemption policy primarily within the context of the recent congressional proposal H.R. 975. I develop an incomplete markets general equi librium model where secured and unsecured assets coexist and are treated di¤erentially in a bankruptcy proceeding. I …nd that when exemptions are made very strict relative to current averages, …ling rates and welfare fall somewhat, but when exemptions are increased, even dramatically, …ling rates and welfare remain unchanged. The results are robust, and show that increases in bankruptcy exemptions beyond current state averages are largely a matter of indi¤erence, and do not merit the heated debate they have generated. 
Introduction
Personal bankruptcy …lings have grown rapidly over the past decade. In 1990, there were approximately 700,000 …lings. By 1997, …lings had nearly doubled to 1.3 million, a level that they have since averaged. The resulting losses to creditors have been estimated at over forty billion dollars annually (WEFA (1998) ). Consequently, there is now an intense public debate on the desirability of comprehensive bankruptcy reform. In this debate, special emphasis has been placed on exemptions, which are the rules governing the amount of wealth that may be retained by a debtor in a bankruptcy …ling.
In particular, several recent recommendations have advocated a uniform, limited, and federally mandated exemption level, the most recent of which is the Bill in Congress entitled "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003" (H.R. 975). The provisions of the bill with respect to exemptions concern the "homestead" exemption, which applies to home equity, and is for most households by far the largest exemption. Currently, homestead exemptions are set by state law and are unrestricted by federal bankruptcy law.
The House version of the bill seeks to place a $100,000 cap on homestead exemptions for a house purchased within two years of declaring bankruptcy. Additionally, the Bill would restrict households to exemptions established under state laws for houses purchased more than two years prior to bankruptcy. The (untitled) Senate version of this Bill seeks to override state laws by placing a nationwide $125,000 cap on homestead exemptions for all bankruptcy …lers, regardless of when the house was purchased. 1 The senate proposal is aimed primarily at limiting the unlimited exemptions currently allowed in eleven states. However, while the proposal would limit exemptions in such states, it nevertheless implies increases in exemptions in fourteen states, some of them substantial. 2 Currently, exemptions vary across states, but work of Elul and Subramanian (2002) suggests that the cost of interstate moves to exploit higher exemptions is prohibitive for most. Therefore, the uniform exemption proposal will result in a large increase in the number of U.S. households with easy access to high exemptions.
nine-member panel known as the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) made recommendations to increase exemptions and eliminates states' rights to force households to use more restrictive state exemptions. These recommendations proved contentious, and survived only by a 5-4 margin. In a forceful reply to the majority opinion, dissenting Com mission members (Jones and Shepard [1997] ) argued that it was "...highly likely that these liberal exemptions [would] translate into the …ling of more Chapter 7 liquidation cases".
Secondly, the dissenters argued that the NBRC proposal gave "...debtors a head start, not a fresh start" by enabling "...many Americans to escape their contractual obligations while maintaining levels of wealth that the vast majority of Americans do not enjoy." 4 In this paper I ask three questions. First, as asserted above, will dramatic changes in exemptions, such as the ones being proposed by the Congress and Senate, or those proposed earlier, cause an equally dramatic change in bankruptcy rates? Second, with respect to dis tributive e¤ects, will high uniform exemptions give debtors a "head start" or just a "fresh start"? Third, from a normative perspective, what are the welfare consequences of uniform exemption law? To address these three questions, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete insurance markets, secured and unsecured credit, and liquidity con straints. Most importantly, I incorporate a well de…ned bankruptcy law that distinguishes between secured and unsecured debt. I calibrate the model to the …ling behavior of U.S.
homeowners, and then study the e¤ects of uniform exemptions.
The results are striking. When exemptions are varied from extremely lax to extremely strict levels, bankruptcy incidence and unsecured interest rates respond only minimally.
More importantly, in the benchmark case, the welfare e¤ects from varying exemptions are modest, at consistently less than $2 per household annually in steady state. The results presented here are robust, and indicate that moving to a uniform federal exemption as high as $100,000 would have negligible consequences. In particular, allowing equity to be 100% exempt in all states will not change outcomes. The conclusion that …ling rates will not rise with exemptions also receives empirical con…rmation. 5 The results show also that Sen. Herbert Kohl's 2001 amendment to Senate bill S.420, aimed at closing the "mansion loophole", whereby some high-pro…le debtors have succeeded in retaining large properties though exemptions, will not lower welfare. Lowering exemptions across all states to near zero 4 The NBRC also cites a Justice Department memorandum to it stating that it would favor "...more modest exemption levels" in a June 18, 1997 letter to NBRC Commission Chairman Brady Williamson from Francis M. Allegra, Deputy Associate Attorney General. The Justice Department made it known that it was "concerned that the asset levels tentatively adopted by the Commission are too high in light of the historical purposes of allowing property to be claimed as exempt". 5 See for example, Apilado, Dauten, and Smith (1978) , Ellis (1998) , Peterson and Aoki (1984) , Pomykala (1997) , Shiers and Williamson (1987) . However, Fay Hurst, and White (2002) …nd that the …nancial bene…t (driven by exemptions) to …ling does matter.
lowers …ling rates, but also lowers welfare. With respect to a "fresh start" or a "head start", bankruptcy in the model does not reward increases in unsecured debt holdings with higher expected utility, nor does it result in …lers who retain large levels of wealth. Thus, despite the heated debate over excessively lax exemption policy, it appears that it is very strict exemptions which hurt welfare. Lastly, the results also suggest that the observed invariance of …ling rates to state level variation in exemptions does not imply or require signi…cant supply-side responses. Indeed, the failure of the literature to clearly document supply-side e¤ects may simply be because exemptions do not signi…cantly change equilibrium household decision rules, and hence do not alter lender behavior.
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These results obtain because in the United States, personal bankruptcy appears painful enough, unsecured credit expensive enough, and consumption smoothing easy enough, that exemptions matter only for those with little wealth. Calibration of the model indicates the presence of rather high costs of bankruptcy beyond the direct costs of losing any excess equity. In equilibrium, bankruptcy penalties and the premium for unsecured borrowing together ensure that households typically exhaust secured credit before turning to unsecured debt. This is consistent with the data, where the overwhelming majority of bankruptcies, over 95%, involve no non-exempt assets, with debtors typically holding very small levels of equity. 7 The results of the paper are also robust to both to income shock persistence and to the cost of bankruptcy assumed.
A principal motivation for this paper comes from the well-documented ability of households to smooth consumption e¤ectively in incomplete-market settings without bankruptcy (e.g. Huggett (1993) , Krusell and Smith (1998) ). This result immediately leads one to suspect that any large "free lunch" provided by exemptions will be thoroughly exploited.
Surprisingly, this has not happened. I demonstrate here that a simple model of secured and unsecured borrowing with bankruptcy and exogenous credit limits is consistent with the observed insensitivity of bankruptcy and interest rates to exemptions. This paper is therefore complementary to the work of White (1998) who …nds strikingly that up to 15% of U.S. households would bene…t …nancially from …ling for bankruptcy, when only about 1% do. Furthermore, any wealth retained in bankruptcy will enhance subsequent consumption smoothing, especially if households …nd borrowing after bankruptcy di¢cult, as anecdotal evidence suggests they do. Interestingly, I …nd that even when the model is calibrated only to match the aggregate bankruptcy …ling rate under average state exemptions, households are nearly always unwilling to hold assets and unsecured debts together as exemptions rise. 6 Gropp, Scholz, and White [hencefoth Gropp et. al. (1997) ] …nd some evidence that high exemptions lead to tighter credit standards for households with low asset holdings. However, they do not separate secured from unsecured debt, and assume that households can transform one into other at low cost. 7 See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989) . 8 If, instead, I had calibrated the model to the strictest state exemptions, this would would have led to
That is, in precisely an environment where they might distort decisions substantially, ex emptions are found to be of only limited importance in in ‡uencing bankruptcy rates, prices, and household portfolios.
It is useful to compare the environment developed here with the single-asset (net wealth) model of bankruptcy studied in Athreya (2002) , where it was found that income based means-tests for bankruptcy did not substantially alter equilibrium prices, quantities, or wel fare. However, the exemptions reforms that make up an important facet of current bank ruptcy reform e¤orts clearly could not be studied in any systematic way in that model. To study exemptions, it is essential to allow trade in multiple assets, whereby households have the option of holding debt and equity simultaneously. This paper provides the …rst study bankruptcy of exemptions in a dynamic, stochastic incomplete-markets general equilibrium model with both secured and unsecured debt, and the di¤erential treatment of each in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In addition to Athreya (2002) , this paper follows and extends work originating in the gen eral equilibrium models of bankruptcy of Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2001) , (henceforth Dubey, et al [2001] ), Zame (1993) , Zha (2001) , and is related to ongoing work of A key distinction between the work presented here, and that of Athreya (2002 ), Chatterjee et al (2002 and Livshits et al (2002) , is that the focus here is exclusively on bankruptcy exemptions with multiple assets, rather than on policies aimed at toughening or eliminating bankruptcy in a single-asset setting.
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Existing dynamic general equilibrium analysis of exemptions is limited, but is growing quickly. Zha (2001) is a …rst step in the study of exemptions. He studies a single-asset model of entrepreneurial bankruptcy with physical capital and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and …nds that exemptions may be welfare improving, and are related to welfare in a an upper bound estimate of bankruptcy costs. Therefore, the results would be biased toward …nding that behavior was insensitive to exemptions. 9 The results derived in the present paper lend support for partial equilibrium approaches, such as that of both Chatterjee et al. (2002) , and Livshits et al. (2002) , at least for the study of exemptions, as risk free rates on deposits vary little with exemptions. 10 Note also that even the elimination of exemptions altogether does not in any way prevent bankruptcy, as it only prevents the retaining of wealth by …lers.
non-monotone manner. In ongoing work, Li and Sarte (2002) 
The Model

Preferences
The environment consists of a continuum of households with CRRA preferences:
Equity
In this paper, I will focus primarily on the behavior of homeowners. Homes are typically the largest asset held by households, and homestead equity exemptions are almost always the largest exemptions o¤ered to households. Bankruptcy exemptions may therefore a¤ect the decisions of homeowners in important ways.
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The value of a house is normalized to s ja s j units of the single perishable consumption good, and will provide the collateral for the ecured debt that households may take on. The labeling of this asset as a "house" is mainly w heuristic, and ja s j should therefore be thought of as an aggregate measure of collateralizable ealth. Total household equity is then de…ned in the standard way, as the di¤erence between the value of all collateralizable wealth and the value of debt held against it.
Financial Intermediaries
As argued by Dubey, et al. (2001) , Evans and Schmalensee (1999) , and Lapuerta and Myers (1997) , the unsecured credit market is well characterized by anonymous, competitive trading.
Anonymity emerges principally because credit card issuers, and even mortgage lenders, typi cally cannot track borrower earnings over time. Imperfect knowledge of the earnings process 11 The assumption of in…nite lives will not be important for welfare considerations. Beyond the standard arguments (e.g., altruism, absence of annuities etc.), recent work speci…c to bankruptcy by Gross and Souleles (1998) argues that "risk-composition", a measure which adjusts for, among other things, changing account age distributions, only accounts for a small amount of the observed rapid rise in bankruptcies and its persistently high levels over the past …ve years. 12 Although they can be large, exemptions are by themselves extremely unlikely to a¤ect the decision to own a home, making the assumption of exogenous homeownership a useful approximation.
will in turn limit the informational content of credit history for any particular household's behavior. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) report that many credit card lenders do not even collect age, employment, and income data at the time of solicitation. Nonetheless, these lenders can and do still price default risk by holding a large, diversi…ed loan portfolio of credit card contracts characterized by …xed interest rates and credit limits. I therefore employ an intermediary who takes deposits from large numbers of agents and makes secured and unsecured loans to large numbers of agents.
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This intermediation is assumed to be costly, with a proportional transactions cost in intermediation, denoted ¿.
Secured and Unsecured Loans
The restriction of attention to credit contracts with …xed interest rates that ensure zero pro…ts, given average repayment rates within a pool of borrowers, helps simplify the model, while preserving the essential feature that default gets paid for with higher interest rates.
This is the route taken in Dubey et al. (2001) , Athreya (2002) , Repetto (1998) , and Li 14 The competitive, …xed rate contracts used here are also consistent with the empirical work of Ausubel (1991) , Calem and Mester (1997) , and Raskovich and Froeb (1992) , who …nd evidence for stickiness of unsecured credit card interest rates. Work by Mester (1994) , Brito and Hartley (1995) , and Evans and Schmalensee (1999) , goes on to demonstrate that sticky and high interest rate behavior is nevertheless consistent with competition. These authors, along with ongoing work of Ausubel (1999) , also show that when information about default risk is not costlessly observable, adverse selection can constrain the use of interest rates to manage credit card risk. 15 By contrast, secured debt in the model is risk-free for the lender, and is therefore invariant to a borrower's net-worth.
Endowments, Assets and Credit Limits
Agents receive random endowments of a single perishable good each period. given by µ hh ´ P (y t+1 = y h jy t = y h ), and µ ll ´ P (y t+1 = y l jy t = y l ).
Agents are allowed to trade in three assets: secured credit, unsecured credit, and risk-free savings. Secured debt denoted a s · 0, is debt that agents cannot default on in a bankruptcy proceeding. Secured debt represents the sum of all mortgage debt and home equity loans held by a household, and is o¤ered at interest rate R s . Unsecured debt, denoted a u · 0, may be wholly discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding, provided no equity must be applied towards it. Unsecured debt represents credit card debt and other non-collateralized loans, and carries an interest rate of R u . Agents may also save in a risk-free asset, denoted a d ¸ 0, and will receive interest payments at gross deposit rates of R d .
Households face …xed credit limits in both secured and unsecured markets, of a s < 0, and a u < 0, respectively. The assumption that secured credit limits do not respond to exemptions is justi…ed theoretically, as changes in exemptions should not a¤ect secured lending.
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In the unsecured credit market, the ratio of median debt discharged in a bankruptcy to median income has remained close to one-half over the past decade, indicating that …xed limits here are reasonable as well.
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy, as modeled here, removes unsecured debt in exchange for non-exempt assets, imposes a bankruptcy cost on the household, after which the period ends. Therefore anal ogous to the "Fresh Start" provisions under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. This is a form of bankruptcy which constitutes over 70% of all …lings, and approximately 90% of all debt in default.
In the model studied here, there are four types of costs associated with bankruptcy.
First, and of primary interest here, is the cost of giving up all non-exempt assets. Second, bankruptcy in a credit history can make subsequent borrowing much more di¢cult. Third, there are explicit costs such as legal fees and time costs of court dates. Fourth, "stigma" appears to be a relevant cost (see Dubey, et al. [2001] ), Fay, Hurst, and White [1996] , Gross and Souleles [2000] ).
Bankruptcy provides insurance but beyond exemptions, bankruptcy costs are "deadweight" in nature. The use of such penalties arises in part because it is often di¢cult to seize wealth, given existing exemptions and protections. Also, penalties such as wage gar nishing, while allowing resource transfers, act as a tax on labor e¤ort, and has therefore been severely restricted by law in many states (see Baird [2001] ). 16 Empirically, recent work of Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) demonstrates the insensitivity of mortgage lending to exemptions.
The penalties for bankruptcy, given their deadweight nature, can most simply be rep resented as reducing the utility of a household that …les. This is the approach taken in both Zame (1993) and Dubey et al. (2001) . Additionally, because the marginal response of consumption, welfare and interest rates to changes in exemptions may vary with the …ling rate, I require that the model include all relevant costs of bankruptcy beyond those explic itly related to exemptions. However, the precise composition of these various costs is not necessary for understanding how changes in exemptions a¤ect outcomes. Let ¸ denote all non exemption related costs of bankruptcy. I calibrate this parameter to match observed bankruptcy …ling rates among homeowners under current exemptions.
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It should be made clear that the notion of costs used here includes all the above penalties for bankruptcies. In particular, as it is true that households do face at least temporary di¢culty in borrowing following a bankruptcy, the parameter ¸ implicitly includes the imputed utility cost of being shut out of credit markets.
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, 19 In this way, credit markets e¤ectively keep track of history in a way that does not require credit status to be retained as a state variable.
Exemptions
Exemptions are rules governing the maximum amount of wealth that may be retained by a bankruptcy …ler. Any wealth above the exemption must be surrendered and used to satisfy unsecured creditors. Exemptions in this model have two e¤ects on borrowers. First, they may provide risk-sharing bene…ts by keeping the consumption of agents smooth when shocks occur. Second, exemptions can damage risk-sharing and consumption smoothing, to the extent that they increase interest rates and fees. Lenders of unsecured credit in turn stand to lose in two ways from higher exemptions. First, conditional upon default, unsecured lenders may lose more in environments with high exemptions than low exemptions. Second, bankruptcy rates may increase with exemptions, thus increasing losses. Let e > 0 denote c the exemption level, such that any equity above e is seized and used to repay unsecured Let e denote the pre-bankruptcy equity position of the household and ja u j the pre-bankruptcy value of unsecured debt. The term (e ¡e) is therefore "excess" equity, which reditors. Secured debt after bankruptcy, denoted a sb is therefore given as:
a s if e < e and a s ¡ (e ¡ e) if e > e and (e ¡ e) < ja u j a s ¡ ja u j if e > e and (e ¡ e) ¸ ja u j (2.
3)
The preceding implies that the payment received by unsecured creditors, called "recov ery", will depend on whether the excess equity held by the household is enough to cover the unsecured debt. If it is not, the unsecured creditor will lose in a bankruptcy. This is made explicit below.
0 if e < e and (e ¡ e) if e > e and (e ¡ e) < ja u j ja u j if e > e and (e ¡ e) ¸ ja u j
The …rst lines of both 2.3 and 2.4 apply to cases where a debtor has equity below the exemption level and so will not surrender any equity or repay any of his unsecured debts. This is the case where the bene…ts of Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemptions are maximized. It is precisely this aspect of Chapter 7 that leads many to the view that exemptions discourage asset holding and encourage credit card debts. The second lines of 2.3 and 2.4 refer to the case when a debtor has enough equity to transfer some, but not all, of his unsecured debts to secured debts. The unsecured creditor receives the equity in excess of the exemption.
Therefore, the household's secured debt after bankruptcy will increase by the amount of excess equity, but his unsecured creditors will not be fully repaid. The third line in 2.3 and 2.4 cover the case where an debtor's equity exceeds the exemption by more than his unsecured debts. In this case, a debtor will be required to transform all his unsecured debt into secured debts, leaving him with secured debts that increase by the amount of his unsecured debt, while his unsecured creditors are fully repaid. Chapter 7 bankruptcy is not useful for households in this category.
The Recursive Formulation
At the beginning of a period, an agent is assumed to know his current period income, y, ; y), is given in Equation (2.4), followed by the set of budget, bankruptcy, and feasibility constraints for those choosing not to …le for bankruptcy. These are given by equations (2.5) to (2.8). The value of …ling for bankruptcy is given in Equation (2.9) by V B (a s ; a u ; a d ; y), whereby an agent pays the cost ¸, has their equity adjusted according to the exemption function in Equation (2.2), and chooses controls subject to the set of constraints given in equations (2.10) through (2.13). In the period following bankruptcy, agents are once again given the option to default, and therefore realize the discounted value ¯V (a s0 ; a u0 ; a d0 ; y 0 ) in both cases. This formulation is expressed below.
where
Equilibrium
I employ the standard stationary recursive competitive equilibrium of Huggett (1993) , Aiya gari (1994) and others. Given a stationary distribution ¹ of households over (appropriate subsets) of the state space, equilibrium requires meeting three conditions. 20 First, the de cisions of agents, taking interest rates and bankruptcy law as given, are optimal. Second, markets must clear, and third, the intermediary must make zero pro…ts in each type of credit. The …rst condition is automatically satis…ed when decisions derive from the Bellman equation (2.3). I turn now to market clearing.
Market Clearing
Given ¹, let marginal densities of asset holdings be denoted d¹ s , d¹ u , and d¹ d for secured and unsecured credit, and savings deposits respectively. Because this is an endowment economy with one perishable good, the securities in the model merely represent a mechanism to redistribute random endowments ex-post. Therefore, all securities are in zero net-supply.
Zero Pro…ts
I require that the intermediary make zero pro…ts in both the secured and unsecured credit markets. Because it is risk free, secured debt must only di¤er from the deposit rate by the cost of intermediation ¿ . That is, R s = R d + ¿. For unsecured debt, …rst denote by x, an arbitrary state vector fa s ; a u ; a d ; y; C Sg contained in the state space X . Let X pos = fx 2 Xja > 0g be the subset of the state space X , such that agents hold positive asset balances, let neg = fx 2 X ja u < 0g denote those with unsecured debts, and let X s X u neg = fx 2 Xja s < 0g denote those with secured debts. In R stationary equilibrium, the time-invar R iant mass of agents has total unsecured borrowing Xneg a u (x)d¹ and secured borrowing Xneg a s (x)d¹:
The total revenue for the intermediary will therefore be (
it cost of intermediation, plus any recovery of neg equity above the exemption they make, The total cost of funds for the 20 The stationary distribution arises as follows. Let X denote the state space for households. Let Â B be the Borel ¾-algebra on X. The individual agent's decision rule for asset holdings and bankruptcy, along with the stochastic process of endowments, induce a transition function for the joint path of assets, bankruptcy, and
income. This transition function will, under fairly general conditions, imply a unique limiting distribution (CDF) ¹ on asset R s, income, and the fraction of bankrupt agents. This distribution is stationary, and therefore
intermediary is total savings multiplied by the gross deposit interest rate,
R o be the probability that an agent in state x will default. Total losses are therefore
Thus, subtracting costs from revenues leads to:
The …rst line of equation 2.13 is total revenue, and the second line is total costs. Specif ically, the …rst two terms represent revenues from solvent agents, the third term represents recoveries of "excess equity" (i.e. equity above the exemption) from bankrupt agents, the fourth term represents losses of unsecured credit, and the …fth ter R m, the cost of funds. Given the preceding, let the aggregate default rate be given by ¦ ´ X ¼(x)d¹. I next de…ne a welfare criterion.
Welfare
The welfare criterion used here is simply the expected discounted sum of utilities evaluated under the equilibrium stochastic process for consumption.
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It is ex-ante expected utility.
The welfare function also weights all agents equally. It is denoted by W and is given below. Given this de…nition, it is easily shown that for ® > 1:
Parameterization
There are nine parameters in the model that I …x ex-ante. 21 This criterion is used by Aiyagari and McGrattan(1998) . The …rst two parameters, ®; and ¯; represent risk-aversion and discounting, respectively.
Their values are standard for this class of models, and I follows Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994) . The third parameter, ¿, is the transactions cost on secured and unsecured borrowing, and is parametrized according to the evidence in Evans and Schmalensee (1998) . These authors argue that among credit card issuers, costs of servicing accounts are roughly 5.3% of total costs, but is partially o¤set by interchange revenues of 1.9%, implying a net transactions cost of 3.4%. Information-intensive mortgage and home equity lending is unlikely to be cheaper, and I therefore set ¿ =0.034.
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The exemption level, e, is the de…ning statutory restriction on Chapter 7 Bankruptcy …lers.
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The single largest exemption available to …lers is nearly always the Homestead Exemption. This provision protects some or all of an individual's home equity from seizure by creditors, even when they have substantial uncollateralized debts. Other exemptions include personal property, equity in automobiles, and exemptions for the "tools-of-trade".
While there are federal guidelines governing exemptions, states were initially given the option to opt out of these rules and impose their own. After 1978, when the federal law went into e¤ect, all but eleven states "opted-out" of these federal regulations. However, although almost all states opted out, the exemption provisions they chose varied enormously. For example, the current federal homestead exemption is $16,150, while the state exemption varies from $2,000 dollars in South Carolina, to essentially unlimited in Texas and Florida. 24 22 Evans and Schmalensee (1998), p.#249. 23 The other restrictions involve the number of years for which one cannot re-…le (6 years), and how long bankruptcy can remain on one's credit record (10 years). Virtually all other penalties are issued by either by credit markets (borrowing restrictions, and high interest rates), or through social sanctions and other "stigma" e¤ects. 24 No exemptions are truly unlimited however. This implies that the baseline exemption e be set at approximately 1.14. 26 The income process y 2 fy l ; y h g and the associated transition probabilities, µ hh = µ ll , follow Heaton and Lucas (1997) , who normalize mean (and median) household income at one unit and approximate an autoregressive process for labor income estimated from PSID data with a two-state Markov chain. They set µ hh = µ ll = 0:75, with y l =0.75, and y h =1.25.
This process implies a coe¢cient of variation of 0.25, which is roughly the midpoint of the range documented by Aiyagari (1994) and is consistent with work by Card (1987, 1989) , and recent work of Quadrini (1999) .
The …nal two parameters a s , and a u are the credit limits on secured and unsecured credit respectively. As discussed in the introduction, exemptions have not been found to have …rst-order e¤ects on credit supply, which suggests that …xed limits on secured credit are a reasonable approximation (see, e.g., Berkowitz and Hynes[1999] , Grant [2000] ). In 1997, the median price of existing housing was approximately $120,000, slightly greater than twice annual mean household income. 27 This imposes a natural limit on secured credit at 2.0 units. The limit on unsecured credit is set at 0.5 units and is guided by observing the level of median credit card debt discharged in bankruptcy, which has remained roughly stable at 50% of median household income (see Sullivan et al (2000) , and Bermant and Flynn (1999) ).
This implies a total credit limit of 2.5 units, and is in accordance with the (1991) mean debt-income ratio of 2.5, found by Sullivan et al. (2000) . 
Benchmark Parameters and Data
The shocks hitting households in the model are to be interpreted as income shocks arising from the labor market outcomes of job loss, overtime, displacement etc. I do not explicitly model other shocks a¤ecting households such as catastrophic medical shocks or law suits.
The latter are in the nature of "expense shocks", and are studied in some detail by Livshits The total …ling rate ¦ is the only parameter which will be calibrated within the model. is analogous to the rate available on short-maturity risk-free assets, such as the average ex-post real 3-month T-bill rate. Adjusted for CPI in ‡ation, the mean risk-free T-bill rate in this period is 2.6%.
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Last, as documented above, the ratio of median debt discharged in a bankruptcy to median household income was roughly 0.5, and is denoted "med(D bk )/med(I)". 
2.6% 0.5
Results
The results tell a simple but striking story. Exemptions do not matter substantially for prices, bankruptcy rates, distribution, and welfare. Exemptions below the current state average have only minor e¤ects on both bankruptcy incidence and welfare, while exemptions above the mean have no e¤ect. The results also cast doubt on the bleak scenario painted by the opponents of the current Bankruptcy reform bill H.R. 975. The belief that a high uniform exemption level would result in households walking away from debt while retaining wealth levels far above average is not borne out in equilibrium. Additionally, the cap suggested in Sen. Kohl's proposed amendment (to Senate bill S.420) will not a¤ect welfare. In fact, the results suggest that an optimal uniform Federal exemption may simply be the current average state exemption. This occurs as model implies that the cost of …ling, using nationwide average …ling rates, is high. Furthermore, while unconditional default rates are not high, the likelihood of bankruptcy, given unsecured borrowing, implies a substantial premium on such unsecured credit. These costs, in turn give households incentives to …rst exhaust all available secured debt, and only then turn to holding large levels of unsecured debt. Thus, exemptions will not matter, and bankruptcy will be essentially invariant to exemptions.
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The results in Table 3 also suggest that the model provides an accurate account for the invariance of …ling rates to exemptions, even if credit supply were to remain unchanged.
I turn now to speci…c experiments and their outcomes. First, the benchmark case is given in the second row of Table 3 , where the bankruptcy exemption is set at the state mean of $58,000, which corresponds to 1.14 units of consumption. The non-exemption cost of bankruptcy ¸, is set at 1.05 units to match observed homeowner bankruptcy incidence.
Equilibrium consumption in the low-income state (the only state in which agents default) for a household with the median amount of debt for bankruptcy …lers is 0.57 units. From this baseline, ¸ = 1:05 is equivalent to a one-period reduction of 0.115 units of consumption.
In 1997 dollar terms, this implies a per-household member penalty equivalent to $2,200.
The main results, shown in Table 3 in Appendix A, reveal that the model does well in capturing both interest rate facts and also the median level of debt relative to median 34 As noted earlier, the need for individuals to save to deal with contingencies is certainly more costly than …rst-best insurance, and may have lead to bankruptcy procedures. In contrast, see Jackson (2001) and Baird household income discharged in bankruptcy. In the top row, I present current U.S. data, and in the second row, results from the model under the current average state exemption. The results that the benchmark case accurately captures the data is particularly encouraging, as the model was only calibrated to match the aggregate …ling rate. As exemptions are tightened from 1.14 to 0.01 units, or, in current dollars, from $58,000 to $500, …ling rates fall non-trivially from 0.30% to 0.19%. This represents a decline of approximately 100,000 …lings annually. However, the tight exemption seems to hinder consumption smoothing only slightly. In particular, consumption volatility, denoted C.V.-C, and shown in Table 4 In terms of the levels of debt discharged in bankruptcy, in Table 3 For very strict exemptions, households will have to hold very low equity levels in order to avoid surrendering equity in a bankruptcy. However, holding such low equity will make them more willing, all else equal, to hold unsecured debt, as the e¤ective cost of bankruptcy, inclusive of the cost of giving up equity, has fallen. This leads to marginally higher debt levels at the time of …ling. Conversely, as exemptions become more relaxed, households may keep more equity while holding a given level of unsecured debt without a¤ecting the cost of bankruptcy they face. As shocks hit such households, they may be more willing at the margin to …le for bankruptcy, leading to both a higher …ling rate, as well as slightly lower debt levels at the time of …ling. As exemptions rise further, however, the ability of households to shelter wealth in bankruptcy is further improved. Therefore, households do not need to be concerned about keeping their bankruptcy option "in the money". In turn, households may be marginally more willing to hold unsecured debt for a given equity level, consistent with the miniscule rise in debt discharged. benchmark case, where e=1.14, Med(D bk are severely tightened to e I next document the impact of exemptions on consumption smoothing and asset holding behavior. These results are documented in Table 4 . The central …nding is that of an absence of any e¤ect of exemptions on the variability in secured and unsecured debt holdings. Note …rst that cross-sectional measures, such as Gini coe¢cients and coe¢cients of variation, co incide with long-run measures for a given household. In all cases studied here, the coe¢cient of variation of secured debt is 1.39. Consumption equality, as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient, denoted "Gini-C" in Table 4 , does rise marginally from 0.0461 when e=1.14, to 0.0465 when e=0.01. The Gini coe¢cients on assets, denoted "Gini-a s " and "Gini-a u ", show that a signi…cant level of asset trade takes place in order to smooth consumption. Beyond this, the wealth distribution changes little with exemptions, and is therefore not described in further detail.
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In the model, 2.5% of all households have negative net worth, compared with 7.4% found by Repetto (1998) using PSID data. Of those households in bankruptcy, 100% had negative net worth, broadly consistent with Sullivan et al. (1989) who found that 84% of households in bankruptcy had negative net worth.
Decision Rules
The underlying decision rules used by households are helpful for understanding what drives the main result that exemptions do not matter very much for outcomes. The central feature shared by Figures 1a and 1b is that the point at which the value of bankruptcy exceeds that of solvency is not highly sensitive to the exemption level.
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This is true both when secured debt is maximized, as well as when unsecured debt is maximized.
In Figure 1a , I display the case where unsecured debt is maximized at a u and study the role of exemptions in altering the impact of secured debt on the bankruptcy decision.
When e=0.01, the highest equity level for which bankruptcy is optimal is seen to be ap proximately 0.05 units (a secured debt level of (-2+0.05)=-1.95 units). As the exemption level rises, households with maximal unsecured debt will consider …ling for bankruptcy at successively higher levels of equity. For example, when e=1.14, the highest equity level for which bankruptcy is optimal is 0.41 units (a secured debt level of -1.59 units). However, even this threshold is far below the exemption. When exemptions are increased further to 2.0, the decision rule remains unchanged. In this case, the highest equity level for which bankruptcy is optimal is still 0.41 units. Thus, households do not consider the exemption level pivotal, and exhaust far too much equity to surrender any in a bankruptcy.
In Figure 1b , I reverse the experiment of Figure 1a , …x secured debt at it's maximal level of a s , and study the role of exemptions in altering the impact of unsecured debt on the bankruptcy decision. Figure 1b illustrates how insensitive to exemptions are the critical values for unsecured debt, whereby households switch from solvency to bankruptcy. In this setting, unsecured lenders need not pay careful attention to exemptions when pricing credit 35 Details are available from the author on request. 36 Throughout the …gures, I focus on the low-income state. Bankruptcy turns out never to be optimal in the high-income case, which is consistent with the data. card accounts.
Having used the value function to show that exemptions do not alter decisions substan tially, in Figures 1c, 1d , and 1e, I display optimal decision rules for households with low income under benchmark exemptions. 37 One obvious feature is that for a large set of se cured and unsecured debt levels, households quickly eliminate debt and hold zero assets. 38 In Figure 1c , we see that secured debt is used by households only when savings is low. If, for example, secured debt were to be at its limit of -2.0, and the household also had pos itive savings of 3.0 units, the decision rule for secured debt implies a rapid repayment, all the way to roughly -0.6, within a single period. Figure 1d shows that savings in this case falls immediately to zero. That is, households will typically not hold positive savings and debt simultaneously, even though the exemption does give them incentives to do so. Also, note in Figure 1d that unsecured debt is repaid rapidly as well, with unsecured debt being immediately eliminated for equity levels greater than 1.8. With respect to bankruptcy, we see in Figure 1d that the level of unsecured debt chosen rises as current household debt rises, but when unsecured and secured debt are both close to the limit, bankruptcy becomes optimal, and unsecured debt falls. This is more easily seen in Figure 1e , where, holding secured debt …xed at its limit of a s , bankruptcy eventually becomes optimal, and unsecured debt is discharged.
I turn now to the role of the bankruptcy cost ¸, on outcomes. In Table 5a , I reduce the cost of bankruptcy to the level where …lings are nearly quadrupled to 1.11%, corresponding to the …ling rate that includes both homeowners and renters, as well as some with large legal expenses. In Tables 3 and 5a , we see that as bankruptcy rates rise, the interest rate on unsecured debt rises as well, from 13.4% when e=1.14 and ¸ = 1:05, to 14.5%, when e=1.14 and ¸ = 0:086. As the cost of bankruptcy falls, households are more willing to borrow on unsecured markets than before. As a result, in order to clear the credit market, a higher rate must be o¤ered for savings, which is why the deposit rate rises relative to the ¸ = 1:05 case. Given the higher cost of funds, …nancial intermediaries must raise rates on loans. Beyond the increase in levels, the spread between loan and deposit rates grows as a larger fraction …les for bankruptcy in the lower bankruptcy cost regime. The e¤ect of lowering exemptions is also stronger in this case than in the benchmark, with …ling rates falling from 1.11% when e=1.14 to 0.54% when e=0.01. However, …ling rates do not respond to increases in the exemption beyond e=1.14 , demonstrating again that exemptions above current the average are unlikely to increase …ling rates. Consumption smoothing is easier with lower bankruptcy costs. Under e=1.14, both the coe¢cient of variation of consumption and the consumption Gini coe¢cient fall appreciably. The former falls from 0.0804 to 0.747, while the latter falls from 0.0461 to 0.0424 as ¸ is lowered from 1.05 to 0.86. To achieve this increase in smoothing, households use unsecured debt more than under benchmark bankruptcy costs. In Table 5b , we see that the coe¢cient of variation on unsecured debt rises, while that for secured debt remains …xed. The welfare loss from stricter exemptions when ¸ is reduced arises as consumption smoothing does worsen. However, these losses are still negligible. The relatively larger response to exemption under low bankruptcy costs arises because more households are near the margin for bankruptcy, implying that a change in exemption is binding for a non-zero measure of households. With respect to the threshold …ling levels, when ¸ is reduced, households with zero equity consider …ling as soon as their income becomes low and their unsecured debt hits -0.40 units. 39 This is a slightly lower level of debt than the threshold of -0.47 units when ¸ = 1:05.
In Table 5c , note that welfare rises only slightly as bankruptcy costs are lowered, even as bankruptcy rates rise substantially. This …nding implies that changes in bankruptcy costs that are restricted to be consistent with observations on aggregate …ling rates, do not alter welfare signi…cantly, even if …ling rates are altered non-trivially. Thus, the results are not driven by arti…cially high costs of bankruptcy and so would obtain even if bankruptcy costs were substantially overestimated.
The fact that the default option is not very useful implies that households will typically be unwilling to pay the …nance costs associated with unsecured credit until they …rst exhaust secured credit, thus rendering exemptions unimportant. In Figures 1a and 1b , we observed households willing to consider bankruptcy when they simultaneously held maximal unsecured debt and positive equity levels (e.g., when e=1.14). However, households will rarely …nd themselves in this situation in equilibrium. This is seen most clearly in Figure 2 , where I display the di¤erence between the value of solvency and the value of bankruptcy under benchmark exemptions, when the income shock is low, i.e., y = y l . As is seen, this surface falls below zero (where bankruptcy is optimal) only for low income levels along with very low equity levels and very high unsecured debt levels.
The decision rules studied in Figures 1c-e , are con…rmed in Figure 3 , where we see that households only rarely borrow on the unsecured market, and in Figure 4 , we see that the vast majority of borrowing takes place in the secured credit market. However, the low level of activity in the unsecured credit market is o¤set by the fact that, conditional on borrowing in this market, bankruptcy is frequent. In Figure 5 , we see that conditional on borrowing in the unsecured credit market, a large mass point is associated with a maximal level of credit card debt. From the decision rules shown earlier, we know that such unsecured debt levels 39 For brevity, the analogs of Figures 1a,b , and c are not reproduced here. also occur only when secured credit has been exhausted. These households will therefore default as soon as a low income shock hits them. This implies a substantial equilibrium premium for unsecured loans.
The preceding …ndings are con…rmed empirically. With respect to net worth, Sullivan et al. (1989 Sullivan et al. ( , 2000 found that debtors who could generate revenues by selling assets were a tiny fraction of the Chapter 7 population. In their 1989 study, over 90% of debtors in bankruptcy had no home equity with which to repay unsecured creditors (p.204). However, those who did have assets were nearly always from Texas, a state with an unlimited homestead exemption. 40 41 Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) …nd similarly that the "...vast majority of households do not maximize the theoretical exemption". With respect to income at the time of …ling, Sullivan et al. (1989 Sullivan et al. ( , 2000 …nd that bankrupt households on average had negative net worth, and had incomes that were approximately two-thirds of nationwide average income. 42 and Flynn (1999) and Repetto (1998) report similar …ndings. Sullivan et al. (1989 Sullivan et al. ( , 2000 also note that unexpected temporary drops in income were consistently cited by …lers as the cause of their bankruptcy. I now turn to the issue of whether bankruptcy provides an excessive advantage to households that use it.
Bermant
Head Start or Fresh Start?
There are two tangible dimensions along which to answer the question of whether bankruptcy provides a "Fresh Start" or a "Head Start". First, will many households "...escape their contractual obligations while maintaining levels of wealth that the vast majority of Americans do not enjoy"? Second, for a given equity position, do households bene…t merely by increasing their holdings of unsecured debt, even when they are unlikely to repay? The answer to both these questions turns out to be "no". Thus, while exemptions do not a¤ect average welfare much, they do not appear to provide households with a "head start". The preceding …nding holds true for all exemption levels, income shock processes, and bankruptcy costs used here.
I turn now to some details.
With respect to whether households do emerge from bankruptcy with high levels of wealth when exemptions allow them to, we see in Table 6 that the average equity position of 40 Their …ndings led Sullivan et al. (1989) to state that "We conclude that selling a debtor's assets is unlikely to yield more than trivial repayments for most creditors. " (p. 209) . 41 With respect to equity holdings, an interesting feature of credit scoring models is the use of cardholder age. The data show (see again Sullivan et al. [1989] ) bankrupt households are on average younger than their non-bankrupt counterparts. The model suggests why age may be a relevent characteristic. Young households may be less likely to have accumulated high levels of home equity, and may therefore …nd Chapter 7 more attractive for any given level of unsecured debt. 42 Interestingly, when bankruptcy costs were lowered to ¸=0.86, households were willing to …le even when they had high income, but only in the state where they had zero equity and maximal unsecured debt.
households in bankruptcy is between $1,000 and $2,520 in all cases. Thus, high exemptions will simply not result in households walking away from unsecured debt with their wealth intact. This result is consistent with the arguments of the previous section. The result is also noteworthy because it indicates that the invariance of exemptions on both …ling rates and equity held at the time of …ling obtains even in a setting where the supply of unsecured and secured credit do not respond to completely o¤set increased exemptions. 43 A natural way to address the question of whether increased unsecured debt makes households better o¤ is to check directly if the value function of the household is increasing in unsecured debt.
44 Figure 6 displays the value function V (a s ; a u ; a d ; y = y l ) under benchmark exemptions. As is easily seen, this function is strictly decreasing in unsecured debt and clearly increasing the the level of equity as well. In conclusion, bankruptcy is chosen by those with large debts, low equity, and low income, and even large exemptions do not appear to give debtors a "head start" along either of the dimensions explored here.
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It is useful to place the …nding of a non-negative welfare role for bankruptcy exemptions in the context of recent results of Athreya (2002) and Chatterjee et al. (2002) which …nd that bankruptcy as a whole should be made stricter by way of means tests. In Athreya (2002) there is a single unsecured asset whose price falls substantially with bankruptcy law.
In turn, households lower precautionary savings as borrowing becomes less costly. This markedly raises the interest rate on savings, further aiding smoothing. In Chatterjee et al. (2002) , tightening bankruptcy law both reduces borrowing rates on the single unsecured debt instrument, and extends credit substantially. In the present model, there are two distinct assets, with unsecured credit being a smaller part of a household's overall credit line. Thus, given the alternatives, it turns out that households …nd exemptions relatively unimportant and would, in any event, be able to hold low enough equity to avoid surrendering any in bankruptcy without great welfare loss. That said, however, eliminating bankruptcy as a whole, would in this model, likely produce substantial gains in welfare as unsecured rates fell and deposit rates rose. The main message of this paper is that the marginal bene…ts of strict exemptions, given all other existing bankruptcy provisions, are minor.
Robustness
Throughout the preceding analysis, a steady-state perspective was maintained, and any welfare costs associated with transitions between steady states was ignored. However, I now demonstrate indirectly that such an omission is unlikely to be important for welfare. To do this, I ask the following. How would an individual with a given level of assets feel if he 43 However, Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) …nd little evidence that such supply changes are signi…cant. 44 I am grateful to the anonymous referee for framing the question in this way. 45 This feature is robust to the exemption level.
were placed suddenly into a new economy with di¤erent exemption law where prices had already adjusted to their new steady-state levels? To answer this, let ¹ b ¤ ench , denote the stationary steady-state distribution of the state vector, denoting current income and debts, under benchmark exemptions. Let V policy denote the value function associated with the proposed policy, given the steady-state equilibrium interest rates that would obtain under the proposal. Given the stationary benchmark distribution ¹ b ¤ ench , the ex-ante expected utility from suddenly applying a new policy with its associated equilibrium decision rules (which re ‡ect equilibrium prices obtaini R ng under the proposed policy) to an individual with a given …xed level of assets is W f 
If this measure is small, it indicates that even abrupt changes in exemption law generate only minor welfare changes. Indeed, this turns out to be the case, as seen in the …rst two rows of Table 5 . If exemptions were to fall suddenly from 1.14 to 0.01 units, the bankruptcy rate would fall substantially to 0.06%, while welfare would fall by roughly $1.30
per household annually. Similarly, when exemptions are tightened from the benchmark to 0.05 units, bankruptcy rates fall to 0.22%, but in this case the welfare loss is zero. In both these cases, households were holding levels of equity that would have allowed them to …le for bankruptcy under benchmark exemptions, but not under the strict policies. In the bottom two rows of Table 5 , I perform the reverse experiment. Namely, I ask what happens when exemptions are initially very strict, but are then relaxed to allow for extremely high exemptions. In this case, the e¤ect on …ling rates is the opposite of the previous experiment and rises to 0.27% from 0.19% both when e is increased from 0.01 to 1.80, and when e rises to 2.00. In these cases, welfare rises slightly, by 93 cents per household annually.
I now return to the question of how the use of …xed-interest rates contracts a¤ect the results. First, as discussed earlier, for unsecured lenders, there are strict limitations on the types of information that loan and interest rate decisions can be made contingent on. Credit scoring models used by almost all major unsecured lenders are not allowed to incorporate age, address, race, employment, and income information, other than self-reported income at the time of application. Beyond these restrictions, the lack of symmetric information generates a serious adverse selection problem. Ausubel (1999) Sensitivity analysis was also conducted with risk aversion, transactions costs, and also with higher targets for the benchmark bankruptcy rate than the strict target employed in the benchmark. None of these alternative parameterizations changed the central result that change exemptions do not a¤ect equilibrium outcomes signi…cantly. In particular, as shown earlier, the results were not altered when the model was calibrated to a much higher …ling rate than observed.
With respect to income risk and the ex-ante homogeneity imposed in the model, the income process used here is that of Heaton and Lucas (1997) , using PSID data, and is repre sentative of the entire population. The subset of the U.S. population who are homeowners are likely, on average, more homogenous than the U.S. population at large, and face even less risk than implied by the process used here. 
Conclusions
In this paper I developed a dynamic, stochastic, incomplete market general equilibrium model with well-de…ned rules for default. I used the model to study the consumption, interest rate, and welfare consequences of bankruptcy exemptions. The principal …nding of this paper 46 Ausubel (1999) also describes in detail the procedured by which cards are issued, whereby very scale mailings (600,000-850,000 per o¤er) are sent to groups which appear similar. Within this group, accounts are priced similarly, to cover average default rates, just as modeled here. 47 The fact that HELOC rates are typically lower than mortgage rates or auto loans may re ‡ect this. 48 While it would be of interest to consider a setting with substantial ex-ante heterogeneity, I leave this for future work. For clarity, one goal of this paper was to remain as close to standard incomplete-market settings as possible, with the added condition that default be allowed on unsecured credit.
is that very strict bankruptcy exemptions may be able to in ‡uence bankruptcy incidence, interest rates, and welfare modestly. However, even large increases in exemptions beyond the current statewide average will not a¤ect outcomes. The costs and bene…ts for the preferences studied here are bounded above by $2 per household annually. The model suggests that given their ability to smooth consumption without borrowing, both the implied cost of bankruptcy, in terms of future borrowing constraints and other costs, and the spread between unsecured and secured borrowing rates, are large enough to nullify the perverse incentive e¤ects of large exemptions. The preceding conclusions are further strengthened as they emerge from a model that is robust and able to closely match several key credit market facts under current bankruptcy law. 
Appendix A: Tables and Figures
